not created that law. it feels that the law has been imposed on it. It feels that it is merely the interpreter of a law binding, independently of the recognition or non-recognition of it by any individual. It declares regarding itself that its function is not to assume authority over the law: but to bow to the law as having authority over it. Tracing up this law, the mind is led to connect it with the Divine nature and character. We thus find the moral law revealed as an ultimate fact in the human mind, and we believe it to represent an ultimate fact in the Divine mind. We can follow it to its ultimate seat on the earth in the constitution of the human soul, and thence trace it up to its last seat in heaven in the very nature of God. We can follow it thus far, and it can be traced no farther.

" For a thing to be done virtuously," says Chalmers, " it must be done voluntarily: but this is not enough. it is not all. It is an indispensable condition, but not the only condition. The other condition—that to be done virtuously, it must be done because of its virtuousness: or its virtuousness must be the prompting consideration, which led to the doing of it. It is not volition alone which makes a thing virtuous, but a volition under a sense of duty: and that only is a moral performance to which a man is urged by the sense or feeling of moral obligation. It may be done at the bidding of inclination, but without this it is not done at the bidding of principle. Without this it is not virtuous."*

It is not, then, mere well- wishing, mere benevolence, or affection, considered even as an act of the will, which constitutes virtue. The affection shown by the ancient Egyptians and modern Indians towards cats and other species of the lower animals, cannot be regarded as meritorious: nor could any extent of that affection, though it should lead to the founding of an hospital for their behoof, come up to

the morally commendable. Yet we suspect that much of the benevolence that exists in the world. and which is so applauded by it, is of no

have had such a misleading influence in modern German speculation, that they Blight, like the word idea, he profitably banished from philosophy, or employed only as correlative phrases, the one signifying the mind as contemplating a thing, the other the thing, real or imaginary, as contemplated. The word objective is certainly not fitted fully to develop what we mean, when we say that the law i? independent of the individual mind, having authority over it, and over all minds.

* Chalmers's Mor. Phil., c. 5.